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THE UKRAINIAN ROLE IN THE AUSTRIAN-HUNGARIAN STRATEGY OF WARFARE BY CENTRAL STATE IN THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Автор Доклада: 
Fediv Y.
Награда: 
THE UKRAINIAN ROLE IN THE AUSTRIAN-HUNGARIAN STRATEGY OF WARFARE BY CENTRAL STATE IN THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

УДК 94(477) „1917/1918

THE UKRAINIAN ROLE IN THE AUSTRIAN-HUNGARIAN STRATEGY OF WARFARE BY CENTRAL STATE IN THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Yuliia Fediv, Postgraduate student
Chernivtsi National Jurij Fedkovytch University

This article analyses the Ukrainian role in the process of the choice of warfare strategy by Central States. Namely, it describes the Austrian-Hungarian strategy of warfare in the First World War and the place and role of Ukraine in it.
Key words: the First World War, warfare of the European States, Austrian-Hungarian warfare strategy, Central States, Ukraine.

Розглядається роль України у визначенні стратегій військових дій блоком Центральних держав на початку Першої світової війни. Аналізується австро-угорська стратегія ведення військових дій та роль українського фактора у ній.
Ключові слова: Перша світова війна, військові дії держав Європи, австро-угорська стратегія військових дій, блок Центральних держав, Україна.

Statement of scientific problem and its importance. Ukraine's gradual integration into the European Union provides the harmonization of Ukrainian social and political vision of European foretime and tries to reach a mutually acceptable interpretation of the many conflicting points in order to form the future of common European standards.

During the First World War the policies of leading European countries in relation to Ukrainian statehood remains also a sensitive issue on the current stage of EU – Ukraine relations. In particular, one of the points of Association Agenda of EU-Ukrainian cooperation is the collaboration in the sphere of cultural and historic exchange of scientific achievements and elimination of stereotypical thinking of both sides in order to develop mutual respect and new cooperation by not forgetting the past and ongoing movement in the future.

A special aspect of the relevance of the chosen theme is the desire to overcome the historical mythology, demagogic politicized conclusions of previous researchers who have not always objectively determined the place of the Ukrainian people and its political elite in politics of the leading European countries at the beginning and in the end of World War I. After all, the pages of social and political development were often written not always correct with incomplete processing of expert sources, hiding some facts and coverage of non-existent.

Analysis of recent studies on this issue. In Ukrainian and foreign political sciences the topic was purely studied, because the whole study is based on analysis of documents, memoirs, and these materials include three dozen of archives, which were first opened to the public only at the end of twentieth century. In general, among scientist researching the policy of European states with regard to Ukraine before World War I and its relationship with leadership of these states during this period we can identify four main groups of research: a work of scientists of the Ukrainian Diasporas, which have studied this question in this 20-40's of the twentieth century (Dnistryansky S. [2]); Soviet historiography; historiography of national scientists (AP Mirchuka [3], Nahayevskoho I. [4] P. Popik and [5]), and Western European research scientists (Beyera G. [7], T. Hornykevycha [8] J. Redliha [9]). However, the main research is based on archival sources (Central State Archives in Lviv and Kyiv, the archives of Germany [1], Austria [8] and Czech Republic). Sources examining the role of Ukraine in the policy of European states during the First World War, are divided into the following groups: materials of certain archives (archival sources) [1,8], first official periodicals; memoirs [2, 10]; official collection of documents of various formations of national statehood.

The article will highlight the development of warfare strategies by leading European countries before the First World War on the example of the Austrian-Hungarian empire warfare strategy of the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) and Ukraine's place in this strategy. The analysis accomplished the following tasks: identification and analysis of political conditions that led to the formulation of European countries’ attitude (Germany, Austria-Hungary) to Ukraine before the war; setting and studying the main factors that determined the ruling circles’ attitude concerning Ukrainian political representatives; analysis of cooperation between Ukrainian and European political forces and the forces of intelligence and counterintelligence.

The main material and the results of research. Austrian-Hungarian warfare strategy of the Central Powers in World War I, designed by German political circles, provided rapid victory over France and the concentration of military action in cooperation with the Austrian-Hungarian troops on the Eastern Front against Russia. However, this plan provided a clear distribution of responsibilities between the Central Powers’ allies block. However, between Germany and Austria-Hungary often appeared disputes, particularly with regard to Ukraine's role in this strategy and proper actions of the allies.

Austrian authorities began to involve Ukrainian population to deal with Russia long before the outbreak of hostilities. For example, already before the beginning of the First World War the Ukrainian Society contacted Austrian-Hungarian politicians with the memorandum, which stressed that the election reform in Galicia is one of the best premises to ensure the loyalty of the Ukrainian population to the Austrian leadership in its opposition to Russia [8, p. 149].

Austrian authorities agreed with the requirements of the memorandum and have received the support of the Ukrainian national parties’ leaders in Galicia in the armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Then began general mobilization in the monarchy, which had also its place in Galicia, where it was created Ukrainian Rifle Association and the Ukrainian Sich Union. In addition, was organized the foreseen cooperation with Ukrainians in Russia [9, p. 138]. The Germans on the contrary did not intend to use this factor at the beginning of the war and drew attention to the possibility of Ukrainians’ participation only after the declaration of war against Russia.

The idea of ??bringing Ukrainian national movement to action against Russia belonged to the Vienna government, as the Western Ukrainian lands were at that time part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, they at the beginning of the war turned to the Ukrainian unit to support the Central Powers in their offensive against the forces of Russia [4, p. 56]. However, the deterrent factor in relations between Austria-Hungary and Ukraine was the position of Poland, in cooperation with which the Austrians were also interested and they required numerous concessions from Ukrainian side. In this regard, the Austrians made a numerical miscalculation that was a step back towards the harmonization of Ukrainian vector of support for the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the beginning of 1914 agreements were reached, but they provided significant concessions by Ukrainians [2, p. 11]. Promises on the promotion of Ukrainian school system, influential positions of Ukrainians in the region and electoral reforms were not met in that "reconciliation" measure.

In this regard, Ukrainians turned their attention to German leadership. German policy towards Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, was formed in the three centers that significantly influenced the actions of the German government. Pan-German League and the Motherland Party set out to break the Russian Empire and push its boundaries far to the East. Ukrainian movement undertook them into account as a factor that would weaken Russia. The existence of independent Ukraine was considered exclusively within the strategy of German expansion to the East. In its plan predicted German colonization of the Western Ukraine and Black Sea coast. Second - journalistic-academic group, the most famous representative of which was Paul Rohrbach, author of the famous "Non-Russian peoples of Russia and Us" performed by disengaging non-Russian peoples of the Russian Empire. Ukraine considered potentially major outpost in Eastern Europe against the expansion of Russia to the West. Finally, the third group headed by Otto Gershom developed Bismarck’s political direction for the maintenance of good relations with Russia and were of the view that Russia will remain an indivisible state. Also, Germany was the only countries that fought in the East, which has refrained from providing benefits to Poland and found a pragmatic interest in Ukrainian issues. The German ambassador in Vienna took the implementation plan to promote the Ukrainian uprising under control. The first step to establishing relations with German Government was official documents’ transfer from the Ukrainian government to Germany.

This caused a wave of concern in the Austro-Hungarian circles; experts from the Ukrainian question in the governing circles of the monarchy stressed the need for urgent Ukrainian concessions, especially in the determination of the Ukrainian people. The evidences concerning the situation in Galicia and Bukovina were numerous memoranda of Austrian leadership. In the memorandum of Austro-Hungarian consul in Warsaw Baron Leopold von Adrian was stressed out that the Ukrainian people ranked first by value for the Austrian foreign policy and their attitude depends on both the future course of the history of Austria-Hungary. In November 1914 the Austrian Foreign Minister Berhtold noted that "our main purpose in this war is prolonged weakening Russia and that in the event of our victory, we begin to create an independent Ukrainian state on Russia" [1].

Calculation of the separation of Ukraine from Russia dominated by Austrian politicians since the early days of World War I. At the same time there was an understanding that the future Ukrainian state must be truly independent and not governed from Vienna, because the monarchy will not survive to augment its 30 million new Ukrainian. In particular, there was the idea of ??transformation of Eastern Galicia in the center of All-cultural aspirations. Detailing the policy intentions of Vienna, the Austrian consul in Lviv Urbas said that is not in the interests of Austria-Hungary; due to the new post-war situation further prolonging already a long border with Russia. After the occupation of Poland, Vienna would have had much of a Russian-German border zone as a result of conflict with Russia. The way to avoid such a situation will depend, of course, on the development of the war.

To realize the above objectives, Germany and Austria-Hungary send agents to Ukraine in order to examine its potential economic and political currents of secret work, conducting large-scale propaganda shares and returning to their side of the Ukrainian population [4, p. 26]. Special services of Austria and Germany have had ample opportunity to conduct exploration in Ukraine. Even before and during the First World War, they created a powerful bank of Ukrainian agent networks. After its occupation, Austrian-German secret services took the opportunity to use and offer a wide range of German colonies in the Ukraine. For example, many German settlers lived near the town of Dubno, Volyn province [3, p. 126].

The intelligence apparatus of the Austrian-German military communications was high-developed. In Ukraine were six German army corps (17 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions, 2 cavalry brigades) and three Austrian corps (5 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions). All divisional managers have special units (branches) of intelligence; therefore, on the operational and tactical level there were at least 37 intelligence centers [6, p. 91]. In Kiev and Odessa were Austrian intelligence points. In addition, the headquarters of the German troops were dispatched Officer III-B of the Supreme Command Staff of the German army. These intelligence officers, managing all types of intelligence headquarters compounds, and the information reported to the Chief of Staff of the military contingent and direct the Chief of Division III-B headquarters.

Although Ukraine has sent its diplomatic missions to Austria-Hungary and Germany, but an equal exchange of information between intelligence services and intelligence agencies of Ukraine was first missing. As noted in its report of the intelligence chief Colonel Kolosovskyy, department sends the Germans and Austrians all the information from them and does not receive any information from other side, although the Ukrainian intelligence officers were interested in obtaining relevant information about Russian armed forces from the relevant bodies of the Austrian-German troops. Despite repeated attempts of Ukrainian staff and heads of military intelligence to establish mutually beneficial cooperation with Austrian and German intelligence services, this goal was never achieved. Especially difficult was to maintain contact with Austrian intelligence, as its representative in Ukraine, showed distrustful attitude to the Ukrainian intelligence and was reluctant to share information gained from it [8, p. 328].

German and Austrian-Hungarian political circles in turn develop plans for the future distribution of the territories that the allies planned to occupy. The Austrians had planned to divide the territory of this State at the German-Bohemian and Polish-Ukrainian land blocks within Ukraine last assumed the status of autonomy [5, p. 78]. The Germans are provided three options for the status of Ukrainian state after the occupation: Ukraine under German protectorate, Ukraine under the joint protectorate of Germany and Austria-Hungary and Ukraine in the personal union with Romania. However, common to both allies were reluctant to attach all the occupied Ukrainian territory to the exclusion of the monarchy and the fact of recognition of the Ukrainian state [9, p. 16]. Later emperors of Austria-Hungary and Germany made a joint manifesto to the Ukrainian people, which contained the following provisions: the Ukrainian people in all areas will be guaranteed to "complete political freedom" with complete freedom and protection of the Orthodox faith, independence of the Orthodox Church, restored temples ; state lands and lands of all enemies of working people will be adequately distributed to villagers for an everlasting possession; Ukrainian nobility will receive all rights and privileges that will be given to Poles and Jews in the Ukrainian lands, the Ukrainian language will be provided in schools, churches, high schools and universities [8].

It is worth noting the existence of the negative sides of the Ukrainian position under the Central Powers. Thus, to protectorate of Austria-Hungary over Ukraine with simultaneous occupation of Poland, shows the following: 1) contradictions between Ukraine and Russia remain to be greater, 2) contradictions with Romania is expected to double: by the Romanian occupation of Bessarabia it will be Eastern neighbor of Austria-Hungary, 3) military tasks exceed the capabilities of the country, 4) it’s very difficult, almost impossible to pursue both Polish and Ukrainian policy, so setting the border between Poland and Ukraine will amount infinite problem to Austria-Hungary [10].

However, without non-Russian protectorate independent Ukraine is unable to stand up to Russia or would tend to become a radical socialist republic, which is unlikely to be a nice neighborhood for Vienna. Ukraine with resulting from the peace treaty autonomy would be fiction under Russian domination; Russia would again strengthen its impact on it or will solve a new war. Only the following possibilities remain: a) Ukraine under the protection of Germany, b) Ukraine under the joint protectorate of Austria-Hungary and Germany and c) the personal union between Ukraine and Romania.

Ukraine under the protection of Germany would have the advantage that the German-Russian border and the German-Russian conflict there remained a significant extent that Ukrainian socialist tendencies would end up under strong military pressure and the German trade will receive a wide and easy path through the Black Sea to Asia, resulting peace in the Balkans. Acceptable would be a personal union between Ukraine and Romania. Consequently, Romanian expansion would be stopped at the East, the national character of the State will be destroyed and it will receive a long conflict with Russia.

The least desirable would be considered a joint protectorate of Austria-Hungary and Germany over Ukraine, however, as the last out, it is also acceptable - if Austria creates civil administration in Ukraine and Germany assumes the creation of the army. In general, sums up Urbas, should gravitate to the German protectorate over Ukraine, stressing that the Austro-Hungarian protectorate by simultaneous occupation of Poland is incapable because of political and military reasons and otherwise, Ukraine - without the help of non-Russian forces - is impossible [7, p. 24]. When Germany can’t offer this, it is preferable to create a personal union with Romania.

Conclusions and prospects for future research. So, in general, we can emphasize that the Ukrainian factor in the Austro-Hungarian warfare strategy of the Central Powers was associated both with high expectations, and with great risks. However, significant defeat of Germans and Austrians forces forced them to abandon the Austro-Hungarian strategy and move to a new one that would provide a sustained war.

The above events led also review the role of Ukrainian factor in subsequent actions of allies. Then the leadership of both countries stopped on the idea of ??Ukrainian revolution in the lands of the Russian Empire. These views were kept until the end of hostilities.

In further research would be appropriate to focus on the major methods of Central States’ influence on Ukrainian political forces, the main channels of communication between both parties and the Ukrainian position concerning different strategies of warfare of the Central Powers.

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